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Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: 
How Motions to Dismiss Become 
 (Disguised) Summary Judgments† 
Richard A. Epstein∗ 
The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s 
case to be attacked either for its legal or factual sufficiency. The rules 
governing the former are in general adequate because judgments on 
the validity of claims do not require any discovery. Decisions before 
trial on factual matters are much more complex, especially in 
antitrust cases where discovery before a summary judgment motion 
can be highly expensive on open-ended claims of collusion over 
prices or territories. To counteract that risk, all courts today allow 
some judgments to be entered at the close of pleading and before 
discovery. The recent Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly,1 reversing the Second Circuit decision in Twombly v. 
Bell Atlantic Corp.,2 resolved the ongoing dispute by requiring that a 
 
 † This paper was prepared from a speech given at Washington University in St. Louis 
School of Law as part of the 2006–2007 Public Interest Law Speakers Series. 
 ∗  James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of 
Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. I would like to 
thank my colleagues at the University of Chicago work in progress for their helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of the paper. I would also like to thank Brad Grossman, University of Chicago 
Law School, Class of 2007 and Ramtin Terheri, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 
2009 for their excellent research assistance. An early version of this Article, written before the 
Supreme Court’s decided Bell Atlantic v. Twombly was published by the AEI Brookings Joint 
Center. See AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss 
Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact from Fantasy, Related Publication 06–08, pp. 3–4 (2006). It 
contained a detailed analysis of the decisions by Judge Sack in the Second Circuit and Judge 
Lynch in the District Court. I have left much of that material in this Article because it sets the 
stage for what happened in the United States Supreme Court. Although I have worked as a 
consultant for Verizon on previous occasions, I have written this article without any assistance 
or financial support from it or any other defendant involved in this litigation. 
 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), rev’g 
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’g Twombly v. 
Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 2. Twombly II, 425 F.3d 99.  
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complaint contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” While the result of the decision is to be 
welcome, its analysis is flawed. In reality, Twombly III was a 
disguised motion for summary judgment that is best defended as 
properly balancing the relative error costs of stopping too soon or 
going too far. A close look at the record suggests that discovery 
would supply no new information of value, no matter how the case 
was pleaded. Therefore, the proper principle is that courts should be 
more willing to enter final judgments at the close of the pleadings, 
especially against plaintiffs whose claims are based solely on easily 
accessible public information which already have been rebutted by 
the same kinds of public evidence. 
I. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL AND FACTUAL UNCERTAINTY UNDER THE 
FEDERAL RULES  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 with 
great fanfare. Their introduction was celebrated as an obvious 
advance over the earlier rules of procedure that were embodied in the 
standard codes.3 Key to that system were new rules that governed 
pleading and discovery prior to trial. These rules were drafted with 
reference to the litigation most common at the time, such as actions 
on promissory notes, negligence suits for traffic-intersection 
collisions, actions for money had and received and patent 
infringement cases.4 All of these are set out with model complaints 
that take a sentence or two to set out, and turn on one or two key 
facts: was the money owed, did the defendant run the traffic light, 
and so on. Like every procedural system, the modern rules of civil 
procedure had to make room for three sorts of attacks on the 
pleadings contained in a plaintiff’s complaint: the defendant had to be 
able to claim that the complaint did not state a cause of action on 
which relief could be granted; the defendant had to be able to deny 
the factual charges that were made; and the defendant had to be able 
 
 3. For a brief account and praise of the “liberal” elements of the Federal Rules, see, e.g., 
Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & John Leubsdorf, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (4th ed. 
1992). For the liberal rules on pleading, see id. §§ 3.1, 3.6. 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 3 through 18. 
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to introduce new matter that would either justify or excuse the 
allegations in question.5 
All three of these issues could arise in the full range of litigation. 
In automobile cases, the defendant could move to dismiss for failure 
to state a cause of action if the plaintiff does not allege negligence. Or 
the defendant could move to dismiss on summary judgment by 
proving that his car was not involved in the collision.6 Or the 
defendant could introduce an affirmative defense such as contributory 
negligence to bar or diminish the plaintiff’s claim. In dealing with 
these issues, the basic position was that all the legal questions going 
to the sufficiency of the complaint could be decided on a motion on 
the pleadings before discovery, but that motions to defeat the claim 
on factual issues could be made only by a motion for summary 
judgment after discovery had been conducted, usually in a relatively 
compact time frame, given the nature of the underlying dispute. 
There is little doubt that for much of its history, the Supreme 
Court has taken a position that is consistent with the view of notice 
pleading that animated the drafting of the Federal Rules. The most 
important landmark along the way is Conley v. Gibson,7 a staple 
among civil procedure cases, which contains the oft-quoted 
injunction “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”8 
The primary reason for this liberal rule of pleading was partly 
dependent on the specific context of the case in Conley. The plaintiffs 
in Conley were a group of black railroad workers who had 
complained of racial discrimination at the hands of their union, such 
that in 1955 the Court had strong motivation to allow the case to run 
its course. But it should not be supposed from this broad statement of 
the rule that the complaint itself was drafted in some inarticulate 
 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b), 8(c) (establishing standards for denials and affirmative 
defenses). 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Such motions are of course commonplace. See, e.g., Illinois 
Central R. Co. v. Dupont, 326 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment in favor of 
insurance company on grounds that the insurance policy only covered company truck, not 
employee’s personal vehicle).  
 7. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 8. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
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fashion, or that the rule announced in Conley had in fact received 
relentless criticism in the fifty plus years since its adoption. The 
Supreme Court in Twombly III held that the phrase “no set of facts” 
has been “questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.”9 
But on this matter Justice Stevens’s dissent surely has the better 
argument. Conley has long been treated as an authoritative statement 
of the law that has been followed uniformly in the Supreme Court 
and elsewhere,10 and the plaintiffs’ allegations are quite in the spirit 
of the Federal Rules. The Conley complaint is fact-free but gives 
notice of the basic elements of the claim.11  
Twombly III can not be defended if the only question is whether it 
captures the sense of notice pleading in earlier cases. Nonetheless, as 
a matter of principle, I think that the judgment is right for reasons that 
were not voiced in Justice Souter’s majority opinion, but which put 
the case on a firmer ground, and give a far clearer indication of why 
the case came out how it did and how far its scope will extend. As 
matters now stand, it looks as though the decision has made a general 
transformation in pleading rules in all cases, not just within the 
antitrust area, although only the future will show for sure. There is no 
reason to confine the logic of the decision to antitrust cases—which 
 
 9. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 11. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. The court described Plaintiff’s complaint as follows:  
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at its Houston 
Freight House. Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the designated bargaining agents 
under the Railway Labor Act for the bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged. A 
contract existed between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the 
bargaining unit certain protection from discharge and loss of seniority. In May 1954, 
the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs held by petitioners or other Negroes all of 
whom were either discharged or demoted. In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all 
but instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a few instances 
where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but with loss of seniority. Despite 
repeated pleas by petitioners, the Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to 
protect them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them 
protection comparable to that given white employees. The complaint then went on to 
allege that the Union had failed in general to represent Negro employees equally and 
in good faith. It charged that such discrimination constituted a violation of petitioners’ 
right under the Railway Labor Act to fair representation from their bargaining agent. 
And it concluded by asking for relief in the nature of declaratory judgment, injunction 
and damages. 
Id. 
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p 61 Epstein book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  (Disguised) Summary Judgments 65 
 
 
makes it all the more critical that the Supreme Court adopt the proper 
rationale on the question.12 The nub of the difficulty is that the notice 
pleading regime of 1938 performs erratically in the context of 
modern complex litigation.13  
The fact/law distinction that organizes civil procedure does not 
work as well in the context of modern litigation as it does in the 
simpler cases that originally animated the Federal Rules. Looking at 
the antitrust laws under the Sherman Act, for example, there is a 
genuine difference of opinion as to whether certain types of behaviors 
are allowed.14 These cases ask such questions as whether it is 
unlawful for firms to lower prices below their marginal costs of 
production, to tie the sale of one good to the sale of another, or to 
impose territorial restrictions on their retailers.15 These issues are 
 
 12. This includes suits brought against government officials for various constitutional 
violations, or suits brought against private defendants for violations of, for example, 
antidiscrimination laws, which turn on complex evidence of party motive on the one hand and 
industry structure on the other. On the latter, see the earlier Supreme Court decision in 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 13. In this Article, I will concentrate on antitrust cases, but the arguments made here apply 
to other forms of litigation. 
 14. The two sections read: 
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in 
any such combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding ten years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person, or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000 
if a corporation, or if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 
ten years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 15. In this recent term, for example, the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) rejected the earlier decision in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which held that minimum price 
restraints that manufacturers impose on retailers should be a per se violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. For my skeptical views on using antitrust liability against dominant firms in 
vertical situations, see Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The 
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typically decided on motions to dismiss the complaint, or on motions 
to strike particular kinds of affirmative defenses from the responsive 
pleadings. The factual issues are usually stipulated because the 
challenged practices or contractual provisions are all public 
knowledge. Once the legal issues of principle are resolved one way or 
another, then a judgment on liability will usually follow. The concept 
of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action has little relevance in 
modern Section One Sherman Act cases dealing with price fixing or 
territorial division; every plaintiff knows how to draft a complaint 
that says that the named defendants agreed to collude with each other 
in setting prices or dividing markets within specified geographical 
and temporal limits.16 
It is commonplace within the antitrust law to note that horizontal 
price-fixing and territorial divisions are subject to a per se rule of 
liability—or, more accurately, often require very specific 
justifications before they may be held legal. In most litigated cases, 
these justifications are far from the scene, so the only question is 
whether the events in question have occurred. The hard legal question 
concerns what types of rules should be used to decide whether these 
claims of price-fixing or territorial division should progress to the 
next stage.  
As a matter of first principle, that question involves some 
estimation of whether the strength of the plaintiff’s case is strong 
enough at each decision point to warrant a further investment of 
social resources, and a further strain on the defendant’s resources in 
dealing with these matters. My basic thesis is that the 1938 Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are not well suited to the complexities of 
modern litigation, especially in antitrust law, and arguably in other 
areas as well. Although courts have recognized the need to make 
some limited review of the factual underpinnings of a case, they have 
not attempted to make any systematic cost benefit analysis of going 
forward with litigation through discovery. In general, as the costs of 
 
New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (2005); see also California Dental Ass’n v FTC, 
526 U.S. 756, 771–75 (1999); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 16. In this paper, I shall not discuss any cases that raise these substantive questions. 
Instead I shall turn my attention to the contexts of price-fixing and territorial division in which 
there is no dispute over the legality of certain types of practice, but genuine uncertainty as to 
whether these actions have taken place at all. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/6
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discovery mount, the case for terminating litigation earlier in the 
cycle gets ever stronger, and should be realized, especially in those 
cases where the plaintiff relies on public information, easily 
assembled and widely available, that can be effectively rebutted by 
other public evidence. 
The stakes are enormous in antitrust cases where the underlying 
wrongs are often confused with perfectly legal conduct. It is accepted 
on all sides that simple parallel conduct among defendant firms in the 
same industry is not, without more, evidence of any form of 
collusion, because such behavior is what is expected in all markets, 
regardless of structure. Quite simply, the unilateral actions of buyers 
searching for the lowest price will bring prices into equilibrium 
regardless of collusion or market structure, so that identity of price is 
consistent with both monopoly and competition, and hence not 
evidence of the former.17 It is vital not to draw negative inferences 
from mere parallel behavior in an antitrust context. Any such legal 
rule would impose direct costs on business firms as management 
fights the major distractions of litigation, and impose dead-weight 
costs on the economy by soaking up resources in rent-seeking 
litigation. More significantly, entry, pricing, marketing, and other 
business decisions would be colored by a non-dismissal rule that 
opens all American businesses to unsubstantiated allegations of 
conspiracy to restrain trade. Parallel behavior is part of the dynamic 
competitive market processes. It is far more likely to be the 
consequence of sound unilateral business judgments than any 
supposed conspiracy. The prospect that the pro-competitive actions 
of competitors could support class-action treble damage antitrust 
litigation in many contexts would discourage sellers from responding 
 
 17.  
The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, 
mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in 
line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally 
prompted by common perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: 
Separating Fact from Fantasy, Related Publication 06-08, pp. 3–4 (2006) (discussing 
problem of “false positives” in § 1 suits). 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). And so this 
Article, from an earlier incarnation, becomes an authority for itself. 
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to market signals.18 In any dynamic market, we want firms to mimic 
the rational conduct of rivals, which they are less likely to do if they 
fear endless vistas of antitrust liability. Yet those very risks and more 
emerge when the Federal Rules allow a fundamental lack of 
significant, coherent evidence to override what all parties in antitrust 
cases concede to be the valid rule: mere parallel conduct in no way 
raises any antitrust implications.19 
In dealing with this problem of proof, the law will only be able to 
achieve its appropriate ends if it develops reliable and efficient 
evidentiary rules and standards to distinguish between competitive 
and anticompetitive behaviors. In setting out these rules, it is 
necessary to remain cognizant of the brute reality that the legal 
system must always deal with two kinds of error. The first type, aptly 
named false positive, wrongly brands firms that are in fact in 
competition with each other as collusive. The second type allows 
firms that engage in collusive practices to escape detection. In any 
sensible view, both types of errors matter, and the Federal Rules must 
take great care in finding the best way to discriminate between the 
two types of market practices.  
In making these calculations, however, it is incorrect to assign 
equal weight to the two kinds of error. Efforts of collusion are often 
unstable, and are frequently susceptible to correction by new entry. 
This disintegration happens when firms in a cartel cheat by 
establishing a collusive price, or when new firms enter the market 
under an umbrella created by the high cartel prices. In contrast, 
competitive practices that are wrongly condemned as collusive are 
not subject to the same measure of self-correction. If subjected to an 
antitrust ordeal, these firms—even if they prevail after expensive 
litigation—are punished for doing exactly what the law wants to 
encourage. No amount of private entry, moreover, will be able to 
mitigate the damages that the legal system can cause by allowing 
litigation to disrupt the operation of a competitive market. 
Accordingly, there is very good reason to be careful of any lax 
system of pleading or proof that invites a high rate of false positives. 
 
 18. This concern was voiced by the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1075 (2007), as well.  
 19. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1964.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/6
p 61 Epstein book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  (Disguised) Summary Judgments 69 
 
 
Unfortunately, the basic thrust of the Federal Rules is against this 
point of view because it requires only “very spare” allegations to 
meet the pleading burdens.20 The nub of the problem stems from 
needing to decide what must be established at each stage of a case in 
order to warrant its dismissal with prejudice—a decision that the 
original Federal Rules made with respect to the limited menu of cases 
that was foremost in the minds of the drafters. In approaching this 
structural question with a fresh eye, it is essential to examine the 
roles of two key provisions of the Federal Rules. One key provision 
is Rule 8(a), which provides simply that the “[g]eneral [r]ules of 
[p]leading” require “(2) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”21 Note that this rule, as 
drafted, is intended to set up an inquiry of the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint, not its factual adequacy. Indeed, the articulation of the 
rule does not even use the word “facts” or mention anything about the 
specificity of the facts so required. Rule 8(e)(1) adds to the mix by 
stating that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, 
and direct.”22 Once again there is no requirement for any degree of 
factual precision as to time, place, persons or events. There is only 
one provision in the Federal Rules—Rule 9(b), dealing with fraud, 
mistake, and condition of the mind—which requires a plaintiff to 
state the circumstances of the allegation with particularity.23 Why 
specificity is expressly required in this case, and no other, is never 
made clear. The probable negative inference from this proposition is 
that cases involving none of the above, including all complex 
antitrust litigation, do not require that specificity.  
The argument in support of the basic outlook in the federal rules is 
that the pleadings serve only to give “fair notice”24 to the defendant 
that certain charges are against it so that it can prepare for trial. The 
bulk of the action lies in discovery and pretrial motions.25 The 
 
 20. James et al., supra note 3, at 145.  
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(1). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”).  
 24. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). The term “fair notice” does not actually 
appear in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 25. James et al., supra note 3, at 137–38; The flexibility of these procedures is stressed in 
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common view is that the specifics should come out in an open-ended 
discovery process that allows both interrogatories and depositions, 
which may be directed toward “any matter”26 relevant to the case. 
Note that the relevant information, broadly defined, “need not be 
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”27 The scope of the 
discovery is shaped therefore by the ambition of the pleadings.  
At the end of the pre-trial process, the basic structure of the 
Federal Rules does allow for a dismissal of the case on the facts 
before trial under Rule 56. These motions can be made at any time, 
but they result in success for the moving party only “if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”28 That last phrase does not refer to the 
sufficiency of the claim as a matter of legal theory, but only is 
intended to make clear that the standard for summary judgment is 
such that no reasonable jury could find against the moving party. 
More importantly, the motion for summary judgment will be 
routinely defeated if made before the plaintiff has an opportunity to 
conduct depositions and serve interrogatories upon the defendant. In 
the routine automobile accident, this delay may well make sense. In 
the context of vast antitrust litigation, the toll from discovery in all its 
forms can be great, so the pressure is clearly on to see if there is some 
way to obtain a final judgment before the discovery process begins in 
at least some cases. The same rules of discovery that generate one or 
two days worth of litigation in simple contract disputes open up just 
about every record of huge national companies over years if not 
decades. It is therefore no accident that Justice Souter in upholding 
the motion to dismiss stressed the simple but critical point that a 
summary judgment motion will do nothing to curb the abuses in 
 
Justice Stevens’s dissent, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. at 1988; 
See also Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sacks, 
J., making the same point). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 27. Id. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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discovery that occurred prior to the time that it was granted.29 The 
soundness of any regime that governs the relationship between 
pleading and discovery is highly sensitive to matters of scale and 
scope. This issue is not confined to antitrust. The same concerns have 
been raised in connection with suits against local governments, where 
the prospect of discovery before summary judgment has also been the 
source of much concern.30 I see no reason why the same concern does 
not arise in connection with suits against large firms that are subject 
to multiple suits by huge numbers of persons that dwarf the exposure 
of local governments answerable only to their own citizens. In both 
sets of cases the obvious shortfall of the Federal Rules is that they are 
drafted in ways that wholly ignore these considerations.  
The inefficiency built into the basic design of the Federal Rules 
has provoked some judicial response by courts that seek to redress 
this critical imbalance. The doctrinal tools available to deal with this 
issue are as limited as the problem is serious. The effort to handle the 
problem of too much discovery boils down in practice to the delicate 
issue of whether Rule 8, which is directed toward securing the 
sufficiency of the pleadings, can be brought to bear in cases where 
the challenge is to the adequacy of the underlying facts. Read 
literally, Rule 8 does not leave any avenue open for a defendant to 
have a case dismissed on the ground that it lacks any credible factual 
evidence to support it.31 In principle, therefore, it looks as though 
Rule 56 is the only route for pretrial dismissal for want of proof. The 
 
 29. “And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by 
‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid instructions to 
juries,’; the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.” Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (citing 
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)).  
 30. Thus the Court in Twombly III, citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 
515 (2002), notes the possibility of similar abuses in connection with cases under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1973–74; see also Futernick v. Sumpter 
Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1996) (dealing with possible suits for selective 
prosecution against local landowners). “Determining ‘all relevant aspects’ of similar situations 
usually depends on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow dismissal on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. If we require defendants to wait until summary judgment, we burden local and 
state officials with the regular prospect of ‘fishing expeditions’ and meritless suits.” Id.  
 31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b) (“A party shall state in short and plain terms the party’s 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse 
party relies.”).  
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great drawback of that procedure is that it allows the plaintiff to 
extort a positive settlement in a worthless case, by inaugurating 
extensive discovery proceedings. 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF TWOMBLY III 
When this critical question of dismissal procedure reached the 
Supreme Court, it resolved the major tension among the lower courts 
that have addressed the issue. The one common thread in those 
decisions is that virtually all lower courts, regardless of the 
disagreements among them as to the proper standard, found wholly 
unappetizing the rigid division between fact and law that looks to be 
built into the Federal Rules. Hence, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Twombly III, the formal distinction between summary 
judgment and motions to dismiss on the pleadings had been eroded. 
Notwithstanding the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal 
Rules, an extensive and confusing body of case law has developed as 
to when a case can be dismissed on the strength of the record as it 
stands before any discovery begins.32  
The Twombly case brought this matter to a head. The case is an 
antitrust suit that tests the relationship between the 
Telecommunications Act of 199633 and the Sherman Act.34 Some 
background information helps to place the matter in context. Twenty-
five years ago the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(“AT&T”) operated as a unified telephone system that enjoyed a 
statutory monopoly within the United States. In consequence of 
litigation that the Department of Justice brought against AT&T, a 
judicially ratified settlement broke AT&T into seven local operating 
companies, each of which was given exclusive right to supply local 
phone service within its designated territory.35 In addition, a 
competitive long-line industry developed alongside, or on top of, 
 
 32. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).  
 33. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified 
throughout Title 47 of the United States Code (‘47 U.S.C.’) (2007)). 
 34. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2007)). 
 35. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
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these local phone companies, in order to complete the telephone grid. 
This combined system was not easy to regulate, and was subject to 
extensive legal disputes dealing with the scope of the initial consent 
decree and the various rates for interconnection between the various 
elements of the system.36 In addition, Congress and the public 
became progressively disenchanted with the rigid monopolies at the 
local exchange level, and both desired to open up to competition.  
In response to the perceived rigidities of this system, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act brought about a major restructuring of the 
industry which was intended to introduce competition at the local 
exchange level by encouraging new Competitive Local Exchange 
Carriers (CLECs) to enter into competition with the incumbent 
carriers (ILECs), either through interconnection, resale or the 
purchase of unbundled network elements.37 The FCC was given 
extensive power to implement the 1996 Act both by drafting 
regulations and through direct administrative oversight.38 The 1996 
Act also preserved private rights of action under the antitrust laws,39 
without addressing the question of how those antitrust actions should 
be modified to take into account the extensive level of oversight 
offered by the FCC and the state public utility commissions. 
The plaintiff class in Twombly I sought to take advantage of the 
antitrust laws by claiming that the four major local exchange 
carriers—Bell Atlantic (now Verizon), Bell South (now being 
acquired by SBC turned AT&T), Qwest Communications 
International, and SBC (instantly rechristened AT&T after the 
merger), colluded to block competitive entry within the industry.40 
The two key paragraphs in the plaintiffs’ complaint read as follows: 
 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 460 U.S. 
1001 (1983) (dealing with the original breakup); United States v. Western Electric Co., 569 F. 
Supp. 1057, 1123–24 (1983) (implementing the breakup); United States v. Western Electric 
Co., 908 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (interpreting line of business restrictions). 
 37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2000). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 143 
(dealing with private rights of action). That provision is not codified in the United States Code, 
except in the notes to 47 U.S.C. § 152. 
 40. Amended Complaint at ¶ 64, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. 
Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 CIV. 10220).  
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Beginning at least as early as February 6, 1996, and continuing 
to the present, the exact dates being unknown to Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in a contract, 
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their 
respective local telephone and/or high speed internet services 
markets by, among other things, agreeing not to compete with 
one another and to stifle attempts by others to compete with 
them and otherwise allocating customers and markets to one 
another in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 In the absence of any meaningful competition between the 
[ILECs] in one another’s markets, and in light of the parallel 
course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent competition 
from CLECs within their respective local telephone and/or 
high speed internet services markets and the other facts and 
market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon 
information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive 
entry in their respective local telephone and/or high speed 
internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with 
one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to 
one another.41  
The gist of these allegations is as follows: the ILECs have 
conspired together to block any CLEC from entering any of their 
respective territories.42 Its second allegation is that all the defendants 
have agreed not to enter into each other’s territory as CLECs, in order 
to preserve each other’s monopoly, and to signal to potential CLEC 
entrants that it would be unwise for them to try to break up the ILEC 
monopoly position anywhere in the system.43 The alleged conspiracy 
is said to have started in February, 1996 with the passage of the 1996 
Act. The plaintiff class, however, alleged no direct evidence of 
agreement, save arguably one isolated public comment six years 
later, but pointed instead to public, inherently innocent facts such as 
 
 41. Id. ¶ 51. 
 42. Id. ¶ 50.  
 43. Id. ¶¶ 40–41.  
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their contiguous territory and the clear advantage that each side is 
said to gain from having as little competition as possible.44 
In one sense, it seems clear that these allegations meet the 
requirements of Rule 8 insofar as they put the defendant on notice of 
the nature of the claim and the time and place of the challenged 
conduct. But at the same time the thinness of the evidence led Judge 
Lynch in the District Court to grant the motion to dismiss on the 
ground that these bare-bones allegations contained no specifics as to 
when the conspiracy was formed, or how it operated, even under the 
liberal pleading rules of Rule 8.45 In so doing, the District Court was 
sensitive to the dangers of inferring conspiracy from parallel conduct.  
This inquiry [into parallel behavior] is admittedly difficult to 
distinguish from the factual analysis that is more appropriate to 
summary judgment, as is evidenced by the fact that cases 
involving motions to dismiss often cite summary judgment 
cases in support of their conclusions that plaintiffs have not 
alleged sufficient facts.46  
It then held that the plaintiff “must allege facts to support claims 
of conspiracy, even in light of Rule 8.”47 The fact requirement that 
had been written out of Rule 8 was in effect read back in.  
That decision was in turn reversed unanimously in the Second 
Circuit, yet not on the ground that all questions of fact necessarily 
had to be raised only at the summary judgment stage. Rather, one 
circuit court too thought that it was proper for questions of fact to 
creep back in at the motion to dismiss stage, but changed the standard 
by which that was to be judged, going to a minimalist standard such 
that “[t]he factual predicate that is pleaded does need to include 
conspiracy among the realm of plausible possibilities.”48 The Second 
Circuit did not rule out the possibility that a summary judgment 
motion could have proved relevant, after discovery.49 Nonetheless, 
Judge Sack, writing in the Second Circuit, was far from confident 
 
 44. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
 45. Id. at 187–89. 
 46. Id. at 182. 
 47. Id. at 181. 
 48. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 49. Id. at 114. 
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that he had done the right thing, given the uncertain state of the law, 
for he wrote: 
We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that on one 
side of that balance is the sometimes colossal expense of 
undergoing discovery, that such costs themselves likely lead 
defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle what would ultimately be 
shown to be meritless claims, that the success of such meritless 
claims encourages others to be brought, and that the overall 
result may well be a burden on the courts and a deleterious 
effect on the manner in which and efficiency with which 
business is conducted. If that balance is to be re-calibrated, 
however, it is Congress or the Supreme Court that must do 
so.50 
The Supreme Court, of course, accepted this invitation. Its 
opinion, as noted, spent a good deal of time addressing the potential 
abuses of discovery. But those observations were in the nature of 
asides, for they did not represent the holding of the case, which went 
off on highly formalist grounds and ended up with this proposition:  
We do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but 
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 
complaint must be dismissed.51 
There are multiple doctrinal grounds on which this decision can 
be criticized. The most obvious of these is that the level of pleading 
specificity in Twombly III is scarcely distinguishable from those 
which were adopted in the examples given in the Federal Rules. 
Under the regnant standard of notice pleading, the defendants knew 
the time and place of all the charges against them, and had some 
notice of the nature of the antitrust claim. If the question were only 
whether this information could prepare them for the discovery that 
normally followed, the answer is of course an unequivocal yes. 
Second, the ostensible distinction between “conceivable” to 
 
 50. Id. at 117. 
 51. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).  
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“plausible” looks to be fuzzy at birth, and bears no particular 
relationship to any of the specific language that is found in Rule 8. 
Surely, a horizontal arrangement to restrict entry or divide territories 
has to count as plausible if the only question that was asked is 
whether the kind of conduct charged is the kind of conduct that 
happens. I see nothing in the tortured application of words like these 
which explains why this decision is right. The truth of the matter, 
quite simply, is that the Supreme Court looked over the allegations in 
the complaint, thought of all the reasons why they did not make any 
sense in the context of this regulated industry, and then refused to 
allow discovery to go forward because it had no confidence that 
thousands of hours of work would dredge up any new information 
that would alter its priors. 
In making this analysis, it becomes critical for the court to see the 
interconnection between Twombly III, and the most important case of 
when and why summary judgment, after discovery, is granted in 
antitrust cases. On this matter the key test for summary judgment 
motions was articulated in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.52: 
To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed 
verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 [of 
the Sherman Act] must present evidence “that tends to exclude 
the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted 
independently. Respondents in this case, in other words, must 
show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of 
the competing inferences of independent action or collusive 
action that could not have harmed respondents.53 
As stated, this test requires the plaintiff to present evidence “that 
tends to exclude”—not “necessarily exclude”—the possibility of 
lawful conduct. In stating this test for summary judgment, the Court 
in Matsushita extended its role beyond the simple question of 
whether certain basic facts were either true or false. The appropriate 
analogy is a decision of a judge to grant a defendant a summary 
judgment in a negligence case, not because some basic fact was true 
 
 52. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 53. Id. at 588. 
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or false, but because the sum of facts that were alleged could not on 
any reasonable interpretation be said to “amount to” the negligence 
that is required in cases of this sort.54 These intermediate or mixed 
propositions of fact and law are ones in which the judge has to make 
a considered judgment about how the evidence fits together against 
some kind of general theory. The issue is one on which there has 
been a lot of skepticism,55 much of which contributed to the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I think that these worries are 
overwrought.56 To be sure, the hybrid nature of the question means 
that summary judgment is not the ideal vehicle for doing this, but 
then neither is a judgment as a matter of law, which also requires a 
court to make the same kind of inferential calculation. Be that as it 
may, no one doubts that this inferential process from basic facts to 
ultimate facts is a proper function for review, and it was just that 
assignment that the Court undertook in Matsushita.57 There the 
plaintiffs did not allege the usual form of price-fixing, whereby the 
defendants obtain an immediate gain from high prices. Rather, they 
alleged a predation case in which the defendants sought to lower 
prices today in order to reap higher profits tomorrow.58 But the 
pitfalls of those allegations were explored in great depth at the 
summary judgment stage. In this setting, the Court stressed that the 
lower prices that were charged by the defendants, unaccompanied by 
other evidence, did not tend to exclude the possibility of lawful 
competition, since firms in an industry always have an economic 
 
 54. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (holding that a 
question may be withheld from a jury when a clear standard of conduct has been determined by 
the courts); Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (holding that jury should be able to 
judge whether defendant was negligent, even if there was already a default standard); 
Metropolitan Railway. Co. v. Jackson, (1877) 3 App. Cas. 193, 197 (U.K.) (“The Judge has to 
say whether any facts have been established by evidence from which negligence may be 
reasonably inferred; the jurors have to say whether, from those facts, when submitted to them, 
negligence ought to be inferred.”). 
 55. See Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 
417 (1921) (“[T]here is no logical distinction between statements which are grouped by the 
courts under the phrases ‘statements of fact’ and ‘conclusions of law.’”). 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 57. I have long been partial to the distinction, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and 
Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 563–64 (1973). For general discussion, see James et al., 
supra note 3, §§ 2.1–2.2.  
 58. Epstein, supra note 57, at 577–78. 
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incentive to lower their prices if they think that they can thereby gain 
market share. In order to make good on this challenge, Matsushita 
and its progeny have required plaintiffs to introduce some “plus 
factors” to pick out those cases that survive a motion for summary 
judgment from those that do not. A plus factor is any form of 
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that individuals work 
independently.59 It could, for example, be in ordinary price-fixing 
cases evidence that representatives of the defendant all converged on 
some out of the way location for a secret meeting; or it could be an 
econometric study which indicated that the prices in an industry took 
an unexpected jolt upward that could not be explained by any 
unilateral decisions of firms within the industry to reduce their own 
individual capacity in the face of a supply overhang in the market.  
The conceptual challenge in Twombly III is whether the tend-to-
exclude standard can be carried over from the summary judgment 
stage to the earlier motion to dismiss stage under Rule 8 for exactly 
the same reason: the basic facts alleged in the complaint cannot 
amount to a credible case of the ultimate fact of an unlawful 
territorial division. In tackling that question, it is instructive to look at 
the extent to which information gained in the exhaustive discovery 
process in Matsushita influenced the analysis of the Supreme Court. 
The short and decisive answer to that question is: not at all. Although 
the Court reports that reams of information were collected, at no 
point did its overall analysis cite to or rely on any of the material that 
was collected in discovery.60 Indeed, the only argument that the 
 
 59. On plus factors, see, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253–54 (2d Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987). 
 60. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986). 
Justice Powell leads off his opinion explaining: 
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more 
than three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’ing 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Two respected 
District Judges each have authored a number of opinions in this case; the published 
ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the 
parties have filed a 40-volume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the essence 
of the evidence on which the District Court and the Court of Appeals based their 
respective decisions. 
Id. 
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plaintiff mentioned to indicate a conspiracy to depress prices was that 
the defendants had, with the blessing of the Japanese government, 
entered into a cartel to raise prices in Japan, which hardly goes to 
show that they would collude in order to enter into a money-losing 
venture in the United States.61 Yet all that information was well 
known before the discovery process began. Instead the Court relied 
heavily on the generic critiques of the success of predation tactics 
more generally, none of which depended on the specifics found in 
this particular record.62 
On this point there had been a vital division of opinion in the 
courts below. Before it was reversed, the District Court had been 
prepared to take the plunge in order to make some factual review of 
the case to see just how far the plaintiffs’ allegations took the case 
toward the ultimate question of market division. “While the Second 
Circuit’s case law on parallel conduct conspiracies has developed 
mainly in the context of summary judgment, district courts have 
required that plaintiffs allege plus factors in order to withstand 
motions to dismiss as well.”63 The Second Circuit did not disagree 
with that assumption:  
We acknowledge that district courts have occasionally eluded 
the distinction between the standard applicable to Rule 
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions on the basis of a well-founded 
concern that to do otherwise would be to condemn defendants 
to potentially limitless “fishing expeditions”—discovery 
pursued just “in case anything turns up”—in hopes, perhaps, of 
a favorable settlement in any event.64  
Nonetheless, it refused to allow the blurring of the older pleading 
lines.65 The Supreme Court clearly was influenced by the District 
Court, and cited its opinion on matters of evidence at several key 
 
 61. Id. at 583. 
 62. Id. at 588–94. All the relevant factual information in this case comes from the various 
complaints. See, e.g., id. at 591 nn.13 & 14. 
 63. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179–80 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (citing Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 255–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), 
and Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).  
 64. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(citations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 111 n.5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/6
p 61 Epstein book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  (Disguised) Summary Judgments 81 
 
 
points. Yet it did not make the leap to ask this one question: what, if 
anything, could be gained by going through discovery in this case? A 
fuller analysis of the various plus factors shows why Twombly III 
should be framed as a mini-summary judgment case, conducted at the 
close of the pleadings, and not as a pointless verbal disquisition on 
the contested meanings of “plausible” and “conceivable.” 
III. A DECISION THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In grappling with this issue, it is useful to think of it as a decision 
theory question.66 Once a complaint is filed, a district court must 
make some decision as to whether to stop the case or allow it to go 
forward. On that issue, the Second Circuit, with its stress on “fair 
notice” of the claim, in effect allowed discovery to commence in the 
absence of evidence of any particulars. After all, the defendants have 
some notice of what to expect from a claim that states baldly: “All 
defendants in the telephone industry have divided territories and 
fixed prices since February 8, 1996.” A more responsible approach, 
which seeks to both give notice and weed out groundless claims, also 
requires the procedural system to make some critical assessment of 
the costs and benefits of stopping litigation at the pleading stage, and 
for any reason, relative to those of going forward with discovery. On 
this matter, standard expected utility calculations suggest that 
litigation should be allowed to go forward only when the likelihood 
of a positive case is high enough to justify what both the Court of 
Appeals (which allowed the case to go forward) and the Supreme 
Court (which did not) recognized as the enormous costs of discovery 
in class action antitrust suits. 
I think that one useful line for approaching this question works as 
follows: in those cases in which the plaintiff has alleged only public 
sources for making out its claim of collusion, the defendant should be 
able to avoid discovery and obtain a judgment on the pleadings by 
using the same documents or the same kind of evidence to show that 
there is no genuine issue of fact left to be decided on the case. In 
effect, therefore, discovery is appropriate only when there is some 
 
 66. Sven Ove Hansson, Decision Theory: A Brief Introduction, available at http://www. 
infra.kth.se/~soh/decisiontheory.pdf.  
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evidence from some nonpublic source that justifies the greater 
expense of the discovery on the case. Although the District Court in 
Twombly I did not articulate this test, nor even cite the Matsushita 
decision that gives it some credibility, that is exactly what it did. 
Thus Judge Lynch wrote: “When deciding such a motion [to dismiss 
on the pleadings], the Court may consider documents attached to the 
complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference, and such 
facts as are suitable for judicial notice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 
201.”67 This logic was precisely repeated by the Supreme Court, 
down to the reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence.68  
Accordingly, both the Supreme Court and the District Court 
treated the defendant’s motion to dismiss as though it set up a “mini-
summary judgment” that is available solely when the plaintiff relies 
on public information and its ostensible economic implications. In 
these circumstances the defendant cannot defeat the claim for 
summary judgment prior to discovery if that defense relies on private 
information that should be vetted through discovery. But so long as it 
relies on what we may term evidence of “like kind” with what the 
plaintiff presents, the motion to dismiss, in line with the undercurrent 
in the earlier precedents, should be squared with the emerging case 
law in both antitrust law and beyond.  
The point here has special relevance in Twombly III because the 
most likely outcome of any discovery will be to leave this case 
exactly where it is at present. As is discussed in the next section, all 
of the plaintiff class’s factual allegations are true (if vacuous). Sadly, 
exhaustive discovery will not advance the substantive inquiry into 
illegal practices. After all, if these statements are sufficient to support 
the inference of conspiracy, what kind of denials are so strong to lead 
to the conclusion that the case presents no genuine issue of fact? Is 
this the kind of boilerplate case that should survive a summary 
judgment motion? I see no real benefit in allowing a case this weak to 
go forward to either discovery or trial on the strength of what, as 
becomes evident in the next section, are such weak allegations.  
 
 67. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179. 
 68. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1972 (2007). 
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The Second Circuit, and Justice Stevens’s dissent69 did not follow 
Judge Lynch’s lead, but played a very different game: they allowed 
the plaintiff to rely on the public information to move the case 
forward to the second stage, but did not allow the defendants to 
answer the factual allegations of the case on the strength of “like 
kind” evidence. 
A. The Twombly Particulars  
The strength of Court’s approach is indicated by Justice Stevens’s 
examination of the case. As noted above, the key allegation in the 
case is that the four defendants, each regional bell operating 
companies, entered into a long-standing conspiracy to divide 
territories, which is a per se offense under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
On the question of law, I have no objection to the per se rule of 
illegality for territorial division. But on the proof side, the plaintiff 
class relied only on three types of circumstantial evidence.70 First, all 
the firms are in the same regulated industry and hence have frequent 
opportunities on which they could choose to collude. Second, the 
territorial contiguity of the various defendants makes it easy for each 
to enter each other’s territories. Third, a newspaper story contained a 
quote by Richard Notebaert, an officer of one member of the alleged 
conspiracy, observing that entering the territory of another bell 
company “might be a good way to turn a quick dollar, but that 
doesn’t make it right.”71 
The Federal Rules were of course not designed with these modern 
regulatory disputes in mind, and notwithstanding their constant 
revision on matters of detail, the basic provisions at issue in Twombly 
III have remained essentially unchanged since 1938. Judge Clark and 
the other drafters of the Federal Rules did not fashion the standards 
for motions on the pleadings in light of the complex institutional 
setting in which modern high-stakes litigation is brought. They did 
not have any awareness that in markets such as telecommunications, 
 
 69. Id. at 1985–86. 
 70. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 71. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 42, Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (No. 02 CIV. 
10220) (quoting from Jon Van, Ameritech Customers Off Limits: Notebaert, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 
31, 2002, at Business p.1.) . 
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firms are vulnerable to extensive and constant government regulation. 
Once the plaintiff alleges the potential gain from staying out of rival 
territories, the question is whether a trial court should put on its 
thinking cap to ask whether the publicly available information 
militates against that possibility. On this question, it takes little 
ingenuity to come up with the conclusion that Judge Lynch pointed 
the Supreme Court in the right direction: none of these bits of 
evidence raises a reasonable inference of collusion when taken in 
light of other relevant public evidence. Look at each of the points in 
sequence. 
B. The Opportunity to Collude 
In most antitrust cases, there is good reason to allow a plaintiff 
some latitude on dealing with matters of discovery, because 
conspirators know that their actions are subject to heavy penalities, 
including criminal sanctions and treble damages, and therefore take 
major steps to conceal them. As a general matter, therefore, Justice 
Stevens is sure to adhere to the general rule that “in antitrust cases, 
where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ 
. . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for 
discovery should be granted very sparingly.”72 But this situation is 
not just any conspiracy to which this general rule applies. The 
plaintiffs allege that the defendant firms have extensive opportunities 
to collude with each other because they are drawn together under a 
common scheme of regulation. The point of this supposed evidence, 
which is easily available against all regulated industries, is that the 
proof of opportunity to collude counts as a plus factor on the matter 
of collusion.73 Yet this notion of the opportunity to collude represents 
only part of the story. It is equally evident, and thus subject to 
judicial notice, that the telecommunications industry is a network 
industry in which all of its participants also have at the very least a 
duty to interconnect with each other.74 It is quite inconceivable for 
 
 72. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1983 (quoting Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex 
Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976)). 
 73. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d at 118. 
 74. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2000). 
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any firm to engage in the cooperative aspects of its private business 
unless it can speak to others on an extensive and ongoing basis. This 
problem with network industries has long been recognized in setting 
a qualification to the usual per se rule on horizontal contacts. 
Elsewhere, for example, the Supreme Court has taken the position 
that communication among banks involved in check-clearing 
operations cannot give rise to an inference of collusion.75 What has to 
be shown is some evidence of communication that sought to rig 
prices, divide territories or restrict output. Mere communication in 
this context has no tendency to exclude legal forms of behavior.  
Nor is this rule in the slightest bit irrational. The ability to 
communicate freely is, and has to be, a regular part of the business 
for firms subject to constant administrative oversight by state and 
federal commissions. The point has indeed already come up in 
connection with the telecommunications industry in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,76 
where the Supreme Court reversed a Second Circuit decision on 
motion to dismiss an antitrust claim (coincidentally written by Judge 
Sack). The Supreme Court reversed in large measure because FCC 
oversight of the various carriers is so great as to render it likely that 
any antitrust action would create endless mischief in areas that were 
under the direct oversight of the FCC. Verizon was, to be sure, a 
peculiar variant on the typical federal preemption cases because one 
federal system was thought to displace another. But the basic point 
carries over here. There is little reason to think that mere opportunity 
to speak raises the risk of collusion when there is a duty to speak that 
is subject to extensive independent regulatory control. The ostensible 
plus factor of communication is thus fully neutralized when that fact 
is set into its larger, public context. 
C. The Conspiracy to Exclude Third Parties from all Local 
Territories 
The plaintiff class also alleged that the defendants have conspired 
to keep all CLECs out of their respective territories. Yet on this point, 
 
 75. United States v. Citizens and S. Nat. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975). 
 76. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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the Supreme Court was right to follow Judge Lynch’s lead that, as a 
matter of sound economic theory, the evidence is worthless.77 Tested 
against the “tend to exclude” standard of Matsushita, even at the 
pleadings stage, it is clear that neither the plaintiff class in its 
complaint, nor the Second Circuit in its review of the complaint, has 
supplied any answer to the devastating critique first penned by the 
District Court. The public evidence used to buttress any inference of 
collusive behavior is negated by the public evidence that each 
defendant has a powerful private incentive to keep all other 
companies out of its own territory. Aggressive defensive behavior is 
therefore perfectly consistent with unilateral behavior.  
Indeed, this conclusion is not one of mere possibility but of 
historical certainty. Vast portions of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act are directed toward the way in which the CLECs may take 
advantage of the interconnection, resale, and unbundled network 
rules in order to facilitate competition. Once again direct 
administrative oversight, not antitrust law, offers the best way to deal 
with that issue. The plaintiff class offers no explanation whatsoever 
as to why defendants would ever risk any collusive behavior that 
carries with it exposure to treble damage actions when each knows 
that all others labor under the same incentive to exclude for their own 
territories. The plaintiff class offers the exotic theory that the ILECs 
have incentive to conspire because if a CLEC succeeds in one 
territory there is no reason why it could not succeed in another.78 But 
the complaint offers no explanation as to what forms of collective 
behavior would even make sense. There is nothing in this record that 
detracts from the District Court’s initial conclusion: “Given that each 
ILEC has reason to want to avoid dealing with CLECs and having to 
‘subsidize’ their entry into the market, each ILEC would attempt to 
keep CLECs out, regardless of the actions of the other ILECs.”79 
Here is a perfect application of Matsushita’s “tend to exclude” test 
based on public information only. 
 
 77. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1971.  
 78. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 79. Id. 
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The plaintiff class does not fare any better in positing that it was 
in the separate interest of each ILEC to enter as a CLEC the long-
distance markets in the home territories of its rivals.80 The first point 
to note is that any assessment on a motion to dismiss should take into 
account the risks and costs associated with the alleged form of anti-
competitive conduct. In the standard price-fixing case, it takes no 
fresh investment in new territories to make the decision to raise 
prices and to lower output. The firm continues in the same market in 
much the same way as it has operated before. The loss in revenues 
from reduced sales is more than offset by the increase in revenue 
from higher prices. If the cartel unravels because other members 
cheat, then the firm can return to the same competitive strategy that it 
had adopted prior to its participation in the illegal conspiracy. There 
is little economic downside apart from getting caught in the usual 
price-fixing arrangement, which is why the antitrust law intervenes. 
Under these circumstances, a trial judge should show under 
Matsushita greater receptivity to a claim of this sort.  
Twombly involves territories, not prices. On the factual side these 
cases are always more complex because the antitrust law does not 
impose on any firm a duty to enter the territory of a neighbor.81 Firms 
work in many regions and in many lines of business, and they are 
constantly having to decide where to invest their capital and where 
not. As a matter of basic economic theory, there are all sorts of 
reasons not to enter into a new territory that do not raise any hint of 
collusion. In this regard it is instructive to compare these territorial 
decisions with the cases of collusive predation that did not survive 
summary judgment in Matsushita and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp,82 to which we can now add as the third in 
the series the predatory bidding decision in Weyerhaeuser v. Ross 
Simmons Hard-Wood.83 
The customary account of predation rests on the sensible notion 
that it is highly unlikely that any firm will invest (current) dollars to 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Corner Pocket of Sioux Falls, Inc. v. Video Lottery Technologies, 123 F.3d 1107, 
1112 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The operators’ practice of staying within their well-established service 
routes did not evidence an agreement to allocate territories.”). 
 82. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 83. 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). 
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drive out other firms in the hopes that it will obtain some monopoly 
position in the future during which time it will be able to recoup its 
losses in (discounted) dollars.84 The first obstacle to predation is that 
the lower prices of the firm will expand the demand for its products, 
thereby increasing its short-term losses. Yet in the future, when the 
firm raises prices, it has no way to ward off new entrants into its 
markets, which could include the firms that exited the market on a 
short-term basis during the attempted period of predation. Absent 
truly extraordinary circumstances, there is no way that predation 
makes sense for the single firm. And there is no way that predation 
makes sense for a group of firms who have to share the losses among 
them. Indeed, if the group of firms did have a monopoly power, the 
better strategy would generally be to raise prices, not to lower them. 
It was in this context that the “tend to exclude” test showed its power 
on summary judgment.85 The parallel arguments work with the 
predatory bidding cases. There are all sorts of reasons for firms to 
want to warehouse inventory, including the desire to buffer 
themselves against anticipated higher prices. When they do so, 
however, they take the risk that the market will turn against them, at 
which point they may well have to sell off some portion of their stock 
at prices below its cost of acquisition, to which must be added the 
interim carrying costs. In addition, it is hard to see how these 
excessive accumulations could lead to predation unless the defendant 
eventually sold its paper products at less than cost, as in the typical 
predation cases. Once again the rule in Weyerhaeuser is not one of 
per se legality, but it is not easy to think of most ordinary markets 
(that is those with multiple players, standard goods and long time 
horizons) in which this ostensible strategy for driving out rivals could 
work. Here too in my view, the plaintiff has to come up with some 
striking innovation early on in the course of litigation to make good 
on the case; otherwise there is no more reason to hold off dismissal 
until the completion of discovery in these predatory bidding cases 
than there is in the predatory pricing cases under Matsushita. 
 
 84. For the basic critique, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981), as discussed in Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574, 
588–98 (1986). 
 85. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly III), 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).  
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The factual setting in Twombly is still more complex by far than 
predation. The first point here is that each ILEC knows in advance 
that its fellow ILECs are geared up to fight the new entrant. Each 
ILEC also knows that entry into this market is not simply a matter of 
offering goods or services for sale at some predetermined price. At 
the very least, long-term success requires extensive capital 
investments in one or more locations to be made in the teeth of 
resistance from the ILEC whose turf is invaded, and competition 
from many CLECs who seek to enter into the same space. There are 
all sorts of independent reasons why a firm faced with many 
opportunities and pitfalls would choose not to invade the territory of 
another firm. The point was made repeatedly by the District Court, 
and it was echoed in the Supreme Court.86 But that analysis did not 
register with Justice Stevens, nor with the Second Circuit, neither of 
which paid much attention to the underlying economics.87 
In response to these points, the plaintiff class has noted that the 
peculiar pricing system under the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
allows any CLEC to purchase unbundled network elements at 
favorable prices. It then insists, as a matter of basic economic theory, 
that there is no rational reason why an ILEC would be prepared to 
leave money on the table, except through an illicit agreement to 
divide territories.88 As a matter of economic theory, this argument is 
flatly wrong once the full context, easily accessible from public 
sources, is taken into account. First, as the plaintiff class itself 
alleged, all ILECs worked over time to keep new entrants from their 
territory. That alone is a reason to be cautious about going in. In 
addition, the District Court did not note what is also true 
economically: the extensive subsidies that were created under the 
1996 Act were not uniquely appropriable by any one firm. Any 
CLEC that entered the market would get the same deal as any other. 
It follows that the entire statutory arrangement had two unwise 
economic consequences. The first is that the greater the entry, the 
 
 86. See, e.g., Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1972–73.  
 87. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly II), 425 F.3d 99, 118 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1985–86 (2007). 
 88. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 184; Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1962–63.  
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greater the cash bleed for the ILEC—itself a good reason not to 
become a CLEC in another area. The second is that the ILEC turned 
CLEC does not get a competitive advantage over any other CLEC, all 
of which are entitled to the same preferential treatment. Competition 
dissipates the subsidy.  
In addition, no ILEC is able to garner any special gains by taking 
on the role of a CLEC outside its home territory. The District Court 
correctly saw that no ILEC could use the dominance in its own 
territory to gain some cost advantage when it competed elsewhere. 
“Since being a CLEC is a different business than being an ILEC, 
expanding into a new area is not simply a question of expanding 
one’s infrastructure, or using the existing infrastructure to provide the 
same services in a new location.”89 In addition, no ILEC could even 
start long-distance service in its home territory until it met a check 
list of conditions (pertaining to showing competitive conditions in its 
own territory).90 It is also worth noting that any subsidy would be 
competed away by other CLECs.91 The entire situation during the 
relevant period created a perfect storm for telecommunications. The 
ILECs were bled by immense subsidies from which the CLECs did 
not prosper. It takes little imagination to find independent reasons 
why no ILEC would undertake this venture. Any analysis of the 
situation from publicly available information thus shows that the 
plaintiff class has advanced no reason that tends to exclude 
independent explanations for the conduct of each named ILEC.  
D. The Notebaert Newspaper Interview 
The next additional fact offered by the plaintiffs to explain why 
Twombly was not just a case of innocent parallel conduct was an 
interview that Mr. Notebaert, as President of Qwest, gave to the 
Chicago Tribune. The plaintiff class seized in its pleadings on one 
indiscreet sentence from that interview—that an ILEC’s entry into 
another territory “might be a good way to turn a quick dollar, but that 
 
 89. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
 90. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271–72 (2000). 
 91. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 340 (2005). 
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doesn’t make it right”—to carry the burden of an entire case. First, 
territorial agreements, like price-fixing arrangements, are done in 
secret, so that it defies common sense to think that any participant 
would announce its illegal behavior to a newspaper reporter. Second, 
the statement does not identify who the parties of any supposed 
conspiracy are, when they got together, or how long the conspiracy 
lasted. One remark made in 2002 does not tend to show behavior that 
was alleged to take place some six years before. Third, any shred of 
conspiracy theory is rebutted by other quotations from the same 
document—public information of which the plaintiff class surely had 
notice.92 Mr. Notebaert rightly notes that the entire pricing structure 
for unbundled network elements was “nuts,” and that it was not 
sustainable, which it wasn’t. Thus in speaking of the resale of UNEs, 
Mr. Notebaert commented, “ I don’t think it’s a sustainable economic 
model. . . . It’s just a nuts pricing model.”93 
Justice Stevens took issue with this view of the world, and thought 
that discovery would be appropriate to explore exactly what else 
Notebaert had said at that interview that had not made it into the 
story, which might reveal some information that placed the entire 
episode in a more sinister light. “One possible (indeed plausible) 
inference is that he meant that while it would be in his company’s 
economic self-interest to compete with its brethren, he had agreed 
with his competitors not to do so.”94 What this analysis fails to do is 
to play the game out one more level. Suppose that this deposition 
takes place, and Notebaert said that he did not refer to any hidden 
conspiracy. At this point, the evidence does not change, but the 
question becomes what should be done once the defendant moves for 
a summary judgment. If in fact the initial inference was plausible, 
then Notebaert’s denial does not put the matter to rest but raises an 
issue of credibility that has to be faced head on before a jury. It is 
again the same story as before. Discovery cannot conclusively 
resolve the matter, so the case has to go before a jury, at which point 
 
 92. See Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1972 n.13 (2007); Twombly II, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 188–
89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 93. Jon Van, Ameritech Customers Off Limits: Notebaert, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2002, at 
Business p. 1. 
 94. Twombly III, 127 S. Ct. at 1981.  
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the pressure for settling even worthless claims becomes 
overwhelming. No large company can reduce the risk of an adverse 
verdict by more than eighty percent, which when trebled yields sixty 
percent of a very large supposed figure for actual damages. The 
invocation of the standard model of the Federal Rules thus authorizes 
large expenditures in order to increase the likelihood of an erroneous 
verdict based on dubious inferences for admitted facts. 
Indeed, in this context, Notebaert was proved correct by the 
course of events. The entire pricing model that he rightly deprecated 
was thrown out shortly after his remarks by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia on the grounds that it did not identify the 
circumstances in which the CLEC was entitled as of right to purchase 
a UNE at below market prices.95 Thus United States Telecom 
Association v. F.C.C. (USTA I),96 invalidated a first such effort that 
previous May, and United States Telecom Association v. F.C.C. 
(USTA II),97 ended the epic process less than two years later in 
March, 2004. Notebaert’s full comments in this article are consistent 
with the view that he thought that the entire rate structure was 
sufficiently mispriced and transient that it would be unwise, 
especially for a company that had lost $219 million, to try to 
reestablish its financial position by going against stronger ILECs in 
their home turf. And surely, it has to make sense, even at the pleading 
stage, to read the entire article, not just some fraction of it. 
E. Calls for Congressional Investigation 
Finally, it seems odd to place any weight on the calls that various 
members of Congress make for investigations of the ILECs for 
leaving money on the table.98 These obvious political gestures are 
simple conclusions by individual politicians who have their own 
complex agendas. In and of themselves, they offer no new private 
information that would allow for a finding that such a combination 
was sensible enough to seduce any ILEC to participate. To afford 
 
 95. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (d)(2)(A)–(B) (1997). 
 96. 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
 97. 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 98. See, e.g., Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. (Twombly I), 313 F. Supp. 2d at 178 
(referencing statements of Congressman John Conyers). 
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these propositions, any weight is to invite well-connected lawyers to 
implore their political allies in Congress to call hearings in order to 
gin up some record of antitrust misfeasance. The safe rule in these 
cases is to disregard all political statements, except to the extent that 
they are subject to independent verification, but not one need rely on 
this general proposition, because public information is available 
which shows unmistakably that the Department of Justice, with its 
vast power to investigate all forms of collusive behavior, thought that 
there was no merit to these allegations.99 
The point here has additional salience once it is recalled that in 
large antitrust cases pre-trial discovery is not the only means 
available for the plaintiff to gather information that could lead to 
filing a successful suit. Thus, it is common for private antitrust suits 
to piggy-back on government investments that establish some form of 
price-fixing so private plaintiffs typically have to deal only with the 
damage portion of the cases. Furthermore, in many regulated 
industries, such as securities or telecommunications, all sorts of 
regulatory proceedings that can sniff out signs of antitrust violations. 
Indeed, one reason why the Supreme Court was surely correct in its 
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing100 decision this past term 
was that the SEC has all sorts of ways to superintend the operation of 
underwriting firms, making it highly unlikely that the addition of a 
private antitrust lawsuit will improve overall enforcement. Put 
otherwise, in Twombly, we are not faced with a situation where the 
plaintiff class seeks to maintain a law suit in the face of some 
mysterious price movements that are not easily explained by 
competition pressures. Rather, the question here is, given all that we 
know about the background logic of the case, and the results of the 
DOJ investigation, should we incur the real potential abuses from 
what promises to be very small gains? In other cases, it may well be 
that the proposals of the dissenting justices for staged discovery could 
 
 99. Antitrust Enforcement Agencies—The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
and the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the Task 
Force on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 79 (July 24, 
2003) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate). 
 100. 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).  
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prove correct, even if difficult to administer. But in this case, the 
prospecting looks like it has no chance of striking gold. 
In sum, the Supreme Court was right to follow the District Court 
in dismissing the plaintiff class at the pleading stage.101 One could 
assume that all the plaintiff class’s public evidence was true, and still 
be unable to draw any sound inference of a conspiracy, given that a 
full account of all public information negates an inference that the 
evidence presented tended to exclude any form of legal conduct. The 
Matsushita standard, which was crafted in the context of summary 
judgment, easily carries over to the pleading stage given that all the 
plaintiff class’s circumstantial evidence proves worthless when 
placed in context. At no time, moreover, have the plaintiffs offered 
any direct evidence on conspiracy, so that the entire case should be 
thrown out for the failure to mount any kind, let alone any plausible 
kind, of proof. Proceeding to summary judgment requires an 
immense expenditure of resources, but promises to supply no new 
information that improves decisionmaking in this case.  
F. Circuit Conflicts 
The Supreme Court was right in Twombly III for yet another 
reason: it helped overcome the strongly different approaches to 
summary judgment that have emerged in the circuit courts. The last 
time that the Supreme Court took a look at the summary judgment 
standards was arguably fourteen years ago in Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,102 which itself only applied the 
basic orientation previously set out in Matsushita103 and the 
subsequent case Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 
Inc.104 which only raised issues of the legality of public contractual 
practices. In the years after these cases, the lower courts have 
diverged among themselves in setting the standard by which cases 
could be dismissed both on the pleadings before discovery has been 
undertaken and on summary judgment after discovery. Some circuits 
 
 101. Twombly I, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 180–81. 
 102. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).  
 103. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 104. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
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have been too strict in their requirements for circumstantial 
evidence,105 while others have been far too lax.106 The differential 
standard leads to skewed results as plaintiffs, who enjoy a first mover 
advantage, systematically bring their cases in those circuits that are 
most willing to allow cases to go to trial. This long-standing 
confusion leads to certain unfortunate dynamic consequences that 
undermine the effectiveness of the antitrust laws. The plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will in many cases be able to fashion their complaint to avoid 
those circuits (like the Eighth) which have artificially high standards 
for summary judgment. Yet they will flock to other circuits, like the 
Second, whose standards for judgment on the pleadings and summary 
judgment are far too permissive.  
The effects of these two errors are therefore not identical, as the 
former will bite only in those cases where antitrust plaintiffs have no 
choice of circuit, while the latter will bite in nationwide suits where 
the plaintiffs have the choice of venue. This form of strategic 
behavior suggests that any circuit which is an outlier on the plaintiff 
side will have disproportionate influence over the entire process. 
Most antitrust cases involve charges of conduct that takes place on a 
nationwide scale so that jurisdiction can be laid in the district courts 
of any federal circuit. Skilled plaintiffs’ lawyers armed with a potent 
first mover advantage can pick the circuits most favorable to their 
position. It follows therefore that those circuits in which the bar for 
summary judgment is set too high will see few if any cases brought 
within them, while those circuits, like the Second, which set the bar 
too low will attract numerous cases, so the two kinds of error will not 
be of equal severity. Setting the bar too high has minor social costs, 
chiefly from creating maldistribution of work across the circuits. 
Setting the bar too low, even in one circuit, raises the direct prospect 
of opening a set of floodgates that should be tightly fastened. 
 
 105. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 
2000); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991); Russ v. Int’l Paper Co., 943 
F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 106. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence does not have to produce more or better evidence 
than one relying on direct evidence to withstand summary judgment); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 
275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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The structural problem lies not solely in the fact that the test of the 
Second Circuit is too lax. It also lies in the use of standards that are 
too high. One instance (in which I was the losing counsel for the 
plaintiffs) that shows this tendency is Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. 
Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan,107 in which the Eighth Circuit 
sustained a summary judgment against the plaintiffs who alleged a 
price-fixing conspiracy among the six major Canadian producers of 
potash.108 The particular evidence presented in that case included 
much specific documentary evidence about future price raises for all 
members of the group, correspondence and exchanges among high-
level officials of the various companies complaining about price 
movements and threatening retaliation, and a detailed econometric 
study that controlled for unilateral changes in output in order to show 
that sharp spikes in prices could only be attributable to coordinated 
action.109 One piece of evidence in this case was a memo from the 
Canadian Potash Export (“Canpotex”), which reads in full: 
FYI Canadian potash producers have reached agreement with 
the United States Department of Commerce and all dumping 
action has been suspended for minimum 5 years. It is 
rumoured that the USD per metric ton increase posted by 
Canadian producers in 1987 to cover possible tariff payments 
to the U.S. Govt will be refunded in full or part. In the 
meantime new price lists are being issued on Monday Jan. 11 
at: Standard Grade USD 80.00; Coarse Grade USD 84.00; 
Granular Grade USD 86.00.110  
Canpotex is a cartel organized to sell Canadian potash for export 
on a joint basis. Its directors are senior executives of the Canadian 
potash producers. It is precluded by law from involvement in the sale 
of potash to the United States, and there is no valid reason for its 
members to discuss the subject of American prices. Every one of the 
defendants had representatives at Canpotex meetings. It would have 
 
 107. 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000). For a justly negative assessment of the weak opinion, 
see Herbert Hovenkamp, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION, 134–35 
(2005), which tracks the analysis in the text. 
 108. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032. 
 109. Id. at 1033–39. 
 110. Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). 
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been easy for them to retire to a separate room and set prices off the 
record for the American market. In fact, these price increases were 
implemented by all Canadian producers into the American market, 
just as stated in the memo. The evidence not only tends to exclude the 
possibility of mere independent behavior, but it tends to establish 
collusion by direct evidence. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit, over a 
powerful dissent,111 held that neither the memo, nor the constant 
backbiting between the firms over the period of raised prices, nor the 
econometric study, either alone or in combination, raised a triable 
issue of fact.112 The net effect of this decision was, without 
exaggeration, to require a plaintiff to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a judge in order to have the opportunity to prove 
it by a preponderance of evidence before a jury. That decision stands 
in notable contrast, for example, to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) Antitrust Litigation,113 which 
quite emphatically rejected the proposition that “if no single item of 
evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to 
conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary 
judgment,”114 only to allow the case to reach a jury on evidence that 
was far weaker than that in Blomkest, albeit far stronger than the 
evidence produced in Twombly. These two cases are both summary 
judgment cases, after discovery, which means that they raise the same 
issue as Twombly but at a later stage of inquiry. 
No matter what stage the litigation, the key issue is only whether 
the evidence presented up to the time of the defendant’s motion has 
any tendency to support the allegations in question. In most instances, 
the pleadings are a bad time to make that call. In Twombly, it was not. 
Both lower courts that decided Twombly understood that the plaintiff 
was seeking to win on a hopeless antitrust case. Fortunately, the 
Supreme Court followed Judge Lynch when it sustained the motion 
to dismiss at the close of the pleading stage. 
 
 111. Id. at 1039.  
 112. Id. at 1033–34, 1038.  
 113. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 114. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
Twombly is of course only one case. But the larger message, 
which covers the vast amount of complex litigation that takes place 
daily in federal court, should also be clear. The current provisions of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in an earlier era 
for litigation that on average has been far simpler than litigation 
today. The Rules operated on an assumption that the greater risks in 
civil litigation came from the premature dismissal of meritorious 
cases brought by ordinary people of little means or sophistication. 
The large modern business dispute or class action does not fit into 
that template at all, for both sides are represented by sophisticated 
attorneys who are able to take strategic advantage of the various 
options given to them under the law. In this environment, the balance 
of convenience has changed. Now there is a far greater peril of 
allowing frivolous litigation to go on too long as well as a risk of 
cutting short meritorious litigation. The cases on motions to dismiss 
and summary judgment are in shambles because weak cases are 
allowed to trudge on through the system while stronger ones are 
knocked out. Some calibration of the scales of error is needed to 
remedy this situation. 
The basic logic of decision theory is that going forward in 
litigation has real costs that should be justified only if there is some 
confidence that the investment in process improves the overall 
decision-making procedures. In dealing with large suits against 
institutional defendants, the risk is not only of a single action, but of 
copycat suits which raise the same issues in a slightly different 
fashion in other courts or against other defendants. It is of course 
clear that government abuse is a serious matter that cannot be lightly 
dismissed. So too, without question, cartels do present serious risks, 
so these antitrust cases should normally be allowed to go forward. 
But in a world in which context is key, a general proposition is not a 
uniform truth. Decisions like Matsushita, Brooke, and Twombly III all 
deviate from the Federal Rules for the same reason. The facts that are 
evident in the complaint are better explained in ways that tend to 
exclude the conspiracy in question. At this point, allowing the case to 
go forward increases both the costs of error and the costs of 
administration; a double loss.  
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Twombly III takes that logic one step further. There is no inherent 
reason why conspiracies to divide territories should collapse of their 
own weight—at least in an unregulated market. But once the full 
institutional setting is taken into account, the factual allegations don’t 
begin to justify the futile discovery that would follow if the motion to 
dismiss were denied. There are two kinds of error in all cases, and so 
long as the plaintiff relies solely on public evidence that is refuted or 
explained away by the same type of evidence (often evidence in the 
same documents), then the balance of error has clearly shifted. I do 
not believe that plaintiffs are entitled to make blank charges devoid 
of all factual content just to gain access to the discovery system. That 
same logic, in antitrust cases and beyond, should lead to a dismissal 
at the close of pleadings in any case where the defendant has negated 
all inferences of culpability by using the same kinds of public 
evidence that the plaintiff has used to establish a factual underpinning 
to the underlying complaint. In one sense this particular 
understanding of the case is a change in degree and not one in kind. 
Both Justice Stevens and the Second Circuit admitted that some 
“facts” had to be pleaded, but thought that the plaintiff had met that 
burden. In cases where public facts do not negate the thrust of the 
plaintiff’s case, there is every reason to follow the older rules, both in 
antitrust cases and beyond. But when the full record at the time of the 
motion to dismiss does not support any plausible factual inference of 
guilt, then it is time to invoke a mini-summary judgment under the 
guise of a motion to dismiss. 
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